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Does the FTC Have Blood On Its Hands? 
An Analysis of FTC Overreach and Abuse of 
Power After Liu 
ANGEL REYES AND BENJAMIN HUNTER† 
Recent cases have called the Federal Trade 
Commission’s (“FTC”) enforcement methods into question. 
After a circuit split developed in the wake of the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Credit 
Bureau Center, L.L.C., the Supreme Court responded by 
granting certiorari and consolidating the case with AMG 
Capital Management, L.L.C. v. Federal Trade Commission. 
The issue in these cases is whether Section 13(b) of the FTC 
Act authorizes the FTC to bypass the due process safeguards 
mandated by Congress in Sections 5 and 19 of the FTC Act 
and, in doing so, to conduct warrantless searches and 
seizures, unilaterally freeze assets, and impose punitive 
“disgorgement” monetary damages. In light of the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Securities & Exchange Commission 
v. Liu, it seems likely that the Court will limit the FTC’s 
abusive use of Section 13(b) and find in favor of the 
defendants in these cases.  
 The FTC’s mission is to protect consumers from unfair 
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angel@reyeslaw.com. Benjamin Hunter is a third-year law student at University 
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or deceptive acts or practices, and for many years, one of its 
main enforcement methods has been disgorgement under 
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act. Section 13(b) gives the FTC the 
authority to seek preliminary and permanent injunctions 
when it believes that the law is being violated or is about to 
be violated. It does not mention disgorgement or any other 
restitution methods, but the FTC has spent considerable 
time and energy building a foundation of favorable case law 
to support its ability to use disgorgement. Its strategy 
consisted of building a body of precedent, based on old and 
inapplicable cases, and it has aggressively pursued this 
strategy with the intention of expanding its enforcement 
abilities. The way it has used its self-created power has 
caused untold damage to business owners, employees, and 
consumers.  
This Article argues that the Supreme Court should rule 
against the FTC in Credit Bureau Center/AMG Capital 
Management. The FTC used shaky and extraneous case law 
to expand its power to include the ability to seek 
disgorgement, and it has caused irreparable harm to 
businesses and individuals across the country. Indeed, 
following the FTC’s use of disgorgement as an improper 
remedy to seek damages, several business owners who were 
subjected to that improper treatment committed suicide, 
making the FTC a de facto judge, jury, and executioner. Part 
I details the methods that the FTC has used over the past 
few decades to expand its power to its current level. Part II 
argues that disgorgement is not authorized by Congress 
under Section 13(b). Indeed, nothing other than a 
preliminary or permanent injunction is authorized by 
Congress under Section 13(b). And Part III addresses the 
numerous constitutional issues that arise when a federal 
agency expands its power far beyond its statutory grant of 
power.  
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INTRODUCTION AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The first indication that the FTC’s enforcement methods 
would be receiving a more robust examination came in 
Kokesh v. Securities & Exchange Commission, when the 
Supreme Court ruled that the remedy of disgorgement 
operates as a “penalty,” rendering it subject to a five-year 
statute of limitations.1 The case included a footnote that 
many believed opened the door for a challenge to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) right to seek 
disgorgement at all. The footnote stated that nothing in the 
decision “should be interpreted as an opinion on whether 
courts possess authority to order disgorgement in SEC 
enforcement proceedings or on whether courts have properly 
applied disgorgement principles in this context.”2 Many legal 
commentators believed that meant the court was ready to 
hear a case on the practice of disgorgement as a whole. This 
case was relevant to the FTC because it uses the same 
disgorgement practices that the SEC does, and it signaled 
that big changes might be coming for the FTC.  
Two cases had worked their way through circuit courts 
that seemed ripe for review by the Supreme Court. The FTC’s 
position on disgorgement was weakened by a Seventh Circuit 
case, the result of which created an eight-to-one circuit split.3 
In that case, Federal Trade Commission v. Credit Bureau 
Center, L.L.C., the court held that the FTC does not have 
authority to seek restitution under Section 13(b) because its 
plain terms provide solely for injunctive relief.4 On the other 
 
 1. 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1645 (2017). 
 2. Id. at n.3.  
 3. See Recent Case, Statutory Interpretation—Stare Decisis—Seventh 
Circuit Uses Methodological Stare Decisis to Reverse Substantive Precedent—FTC 
v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1444, 1444 (2020). The FTC’s 
Section 13(b) power was also questioned in Federal Trade Commission v. Shire 
ViroPharma, 917 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2019), but the Third Circuit court did not go 
as far as the court in Credit Bureau Center. The court in Shire ViroPharma held 
that Section 13(b) only applies to ongoing or imminent harms. See id. at 155. 
 4. 937 F.3d 764, 785–86 (7th Cir. 2019).  
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hand, in Federal Trade Commission v. AMG Capital 
Management, L.L.C., the Ninth Circuit held that the district 
court had the power to order “equitable monetary relief” or 
restitution, and that that power stemmed from the FTC’s 
power to seek injunctions against businesses.5 Now that the 
Supreme Court has granted certiorari on these cases, it 
should radically restrict the FTC’s power under Section 13(b) 
to seek disgorgement or any remedies other than the 
injunctive relief specifically authorized by Congress. 
After the ruling in Kokesh, a case came out of the Ninth 
Circuit that challenged the SEC’s right to seek 
disgorgement. The Supreme Court took the case, and in Liu 
v. Securities & Exchange Commission the court held that 
disgorgement awards in SEC enforcement actions may not 
exceed a wrongdoer’s net profits.6 This was a major blow to 
the SEC’s enforcement scheme because it limits the amount 
of restitution it is able to seek and underscores that the Court 
will no longer allow federal agencies to expand their powers 
beyond those specifically granted by Congress.  
These cases constitute the legal background of the FTC’s 
current predicament on disgorgement. Now that the 
Supreme Court has taken Credit Bureau Center and AMG 
Capital Management, it has the perfect opportunity to 
remedy the issue of the FTC’s massively expanded power. A 
ruling against the FTC in these cases would bring its power 
back in line with what Congress intended. Because the FTC 
has been relying on weak caselaw since it first began the 
process of expanding its power, there is strong legal support 
for such a decision. The Supreme Court should continue 
down the path it followed in Liu and trim the FTC’s power 
back to a more appropriate level.  
  
 
 5. 910 F.3d 417, 426–27 (9th Cir. 2018).  
 6. 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1940 (2020). 
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I. THE FTC’S POWER GRAB 
A. The FTC Worked to Remove Limitations on Its Power 
The FTC began to expand its power after two “provisos” 
were added to the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1973.7 
The first proviso gave the FTC the ability to seek preliminary 
injunctions, and the second gave it the ability to seek 
permanent injunctions.8 The FTC then embarked on a 
decades-long campaign to transform this seemingly limited 
set of powers into an arsenal of enforcement methods, 
including disgorgement and other types of restitution, that 
the FTC continues to use to this day. Before Congress or the 
public realized what was going on, the FTC had gained an 
enormous amount of power, the legal basis of which was 
shaky at best. The FTC weaponized Section 13(b) to allow it 
to storm into businesses without due process and use all 
kinds of enforcement methods without having a statutory 
basis for doing so. This accretion of power is in violation of 
standard principles of statutory interpretation, contradicts 
current caselaw, and was done to make it easier for the FTC 
to enforce the law how it wanted the law to be interpreted 
with a minimum amount of oversight.  
The FTC has essentially admitted that it relies on 
Section 13(b) because it makes it easier for the FTC to win 
cases with less oversight or due process rights for 
defendants. The other enforcement sections that the FTC can 
use, Sections 5 and 19, have many more procedural obstacles 
that the FTC would have to contend with if it were to use 
them in enforcement cases.9 According to the FTC, the 
problem with Section 19 is that “[y]ou need[] three separate 
 
 7. See Robert D. Paul, The FTC’s Increased Reliance on Section 13(b) in 
Court Litigation, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 141, 141–42 (1988); see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 53(b)(2) (2018). 
 8. See Paul, supra note 7. 
 9. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b) (2018).  
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lawsuits to get final relief.”10 Additionally, Section 19 
enforcement actions are subject to a three-year statute of 
limitations.11 That proved to be inconvenient for the FTC, 
and so it began to rely more on Section 13(b), which meant it 
could accomplish the same goals in one lawsuit. On its own 
website, it stated that “Section 13(b) is preferable to the 
adjudicatory process because, in such a suit, the court may 
award both prohibitory and monetary equitable relief in one 
step.”12 These statements, and the litigation strategy that 
the FTC has pursued, show an undesirable and unacceptable 
pattern of trying to skirt due process and change the law to 
favor its battering ram tactics.  
Using Section 13(b) over Section 19 provides the FTC 
with another advantage. Under Section 13(b), defendants are 
not entitled to jury trials because the FTC seeks equitable 
remedies instead of legal remedies.13 This takes away an 
important right for defendants and is another example of the 
FTC using certain enforcement methods to makes things 
easier on itself, causing great harm to those whom the 
agency sets its sights on.  
Federal agencies should not make it their mission to 
expand their power as much as possible. Instead, they should 
focus on fairness and doing the mission that they were 
created to do. The FTC was granted the power, under Section 
 
 10. Brief for Publishers Bus. Servs., Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 6, Publishers Bus. Servs. Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 540 F. App’x 
555 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nos. 19-507 & 19-508) (quoting David M. FitzGerald, 
Remarks at the FTC 90th Anniversary Symposium: Session on “Injunctions, 
Divestiture and Disgorgement” (Sept. 23, 2004) (transcript available at 
http://bit.ly/2kW0VWS)). 
 11. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(d) (2018).  
 12. Fed. Trade Comm’n, A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s 




 13. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. ELH Consulting, L.L.C., No. CV 12–02246–
PHX–FJM, 2013 WL 593885, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 7, 2013) (holding that there is 
no right to a jury for equitable claims). 
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13(b), to ask courts for injunctions. What it has done is go far 
beyond that to help ensure that any business it targets has 
less tools to defend itself. 
B. The FTC’s Reliance on Porter and Mitchell 
The FTC embarked on a legal strategy, starting in the 
1980s, to reconstruct the FTC Act in its favor. The first step 
that the FTC took was building up a body of favorable 
caselaw. The main cases that the FTC relied on to begin 
building up favorable precedent were Porter v. Warner 
Holding Co.14 and Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc.15 
In Porter, the Court gave the Price Controls Board wide 
authority to use equitable remedies such as disgorgement of 
profits in its enforcement actions.16 That authority stemmed 
from the statute that granted the Price Controls Board its 
power, which stated that in Price Controls Board cases, 
courts could grant “a permanent or temporary injunction, 
restraining order, or other order.”17 The Court in Porter also 
stated that when Congress gives federal district courts 
equitable jurisdiction, that comes with the “power to decide 
all relevant matters in dispute and to award complete relief 
even though the decree includes that which might be 
conferred by a court of law.”18 In Mitchell, the Court affirmed 
Porter’s holding that “the comprehensiveness of th[e] 
equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the 
absence of a clear and valid legislative command.”19 These 
cases’ expansive views of the equitable remedies allowable 
under certain statutes proved to be all that the FTC needed 
to start building a foundation of precedent that it relies on to 
this day.  
 
 14. 328 U.S. 395 (1946).  
 15. 361 U.S. 288 (1960).  
 16. See 328 U.S. at 398–99.  
 17. Id. at 399.  
 18. Id. 
 19. 361 U.S. at 291 (quoting Porter, 328 U.S. at 398).  
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The FTC relied on Porter in many of the early cases when 
it sought to expand its Section 13(b) power. In Federal Trade 
Commission v. U.S. Oil & Gas Co., the court held that it had 
the power to exercise traditional inherent powers of courts of 
equity in FTC enforcement actions.20 The court also relied on 
Porter in Federal Trade Commission v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 
where the Ninth Circuit held that it was entitled to use 
equitable remedies outside the bounds of the statutory 
language in FTC enforcement actions.21 The FTC also used 
Mitchell to justify its use of disgorgement. In United States 
v. Lane Labs–USA Inc., the court relied on Mitchell when it 
held that district courts sitting in equity may grant 
restitution unless there is a “clear statutory limitation” on 
that power.22 And in Federal Trade Commission v. Cephalon, 
Inc., the court accepted the FTC’s argument that Porter and 
Mitchell established an analytical course for it to follow when 
deciding on the limits of the FTC’s power.23 These cases show 
that Porter and Mitchell form the foundation of the FTC’s use 
of expansive equitable powers.  
There are problems with the FTC’s reliance on Porter 
and Mitchell. Porter is a 70-year-old case that deals with a 
completely different statute and agency, and the FTC has 
relied on it to grant itself a massive amount of power that 
Congress did not specifically allow. There is a major 
difference between the statute in Porter and Section 13(b) of 
the FTC Act. The difference is that the FTC Act does not say 
“or other order.” The FTC Act specifically gives the FTC the 
right to seek injunctions from courts.24 It does not include a 
catchall phrase like “or other order,” which is the key phrase 
that allowed the Court in Porter to take such an expansive 
 
 20. 748 F.2d 1431, 1434 (11th Cir. 1984).  
 21. 668 F.2d 1107, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 1982).  
 22. 427 F.3d 219, 225 (3d Cir. 2005).  
 23. 100 F. Supp. 3d 433, 438 (E.D. Pa. 2015).  
 24. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)(2) (2018).  
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view of which equitable remedies were available.25 And in 
Mitchell, the Court agreed with the language from Porter 
that stated equitable jurisdiction should not be limited 
unless there is a “necessary and inescapable inference” in the 
statutory language that would limit the court’s equitable 
power.26 But Congress left out any mention of equitable 
powers other than the two types of injunctions in Section 
13(b).27 That leads to the inference that the only power 
Congress intended for the FTC to have under that section 
was the power to seek injunctions.  
Another problem with using Porter as a legal foundation 
is that the Supreme Court has rejected using analogies to 
other statutory regimes when they are used in this way.28 In 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the Court did not 
rely on cases interpreting the Equal Pay Act when it was 
deciding a question about Title VII.29 Its reasoning was 
simply that the two statutes were not the same, so 
analogizing one to the other did not do enough to answer the 
legal question at hand.30 That is what the FTC and various 
courts have done with their reliance on Porter and Mitchell. 
Neither of those two cases dealt with anything even remotely 
related to the FTC, but courts have consistently used the 
interpretation of other statutes in those cases to interpret the 
FTC Act.  
If analogies to other statutory regimes are the proper 
way to interpret Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, then the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc. 
 
 25. 328 U.S. 395, 402 (1946).  
 26. 361 U.S. at 291.  
 27. See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)(2); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AbbVie, Inc., 976 
F.3d 327, 379 (3rd. Cir. 2020) (holding that the FTC’s equitable powers under 
Section 13(b) do not include disgorgement because the statute already “specifies 
the form of equitable relief a court may order”). 
 28. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 640 (2007).  
 29. See id. 
 30. Id. 
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would provide a framework that is much more reasonable 
and in line with basic rules of statutory interpretation. In 
Meghrig, the Supreme Court held that a district court’s 
equitable authority may be limited, even if the statute it is 
interpreting does not expressly limit the court to certain 
equitable remedies.31 The Court also stated that courts 
should not assume other remedies are available when “a 
statute expressly provides a particular remedy or 
remedies.”32 That contradicts the Porter-Mitchell line of 
cases, which have been interpreted to say that if one 
equitable remedy is available, then all of them are.  
By the plain text of the statute, Congress only provided 
for injunctive relief under Section 13(b). If Congress meant 
for restitution and other forms of relief to be available under 
Section 13(b), it would have specifically mentioned them. 
This is seen in other sections of the very same statute, where 
Congress did in fact describe the forms of relief available 
beyond just injunctions. The other two enforcement 
provisions that the FTC has at its disposal both use language 
that describe other forms of equitable relief that are 
available. Section 5 of the FTC Act states that “injunctions 
and such other and further equitable relief as [district 
courts] deem appropriate” are available.33 And in Section 19 
of the FTC Act, the FTC is authorized to seek “the refund of 
money or return of property.”34 There is no similar language 
in Section 13(b). Congress specifically allowed other forms of 
equitable relief under the other two enforcement provisions, 
while limiting Section 13(b) to injunctions. This 
misinterpretation of Section 13(b) allows the FTC to 
circumvent the limitations of the other enforcement sections 
while enjoying the benefits of the less restrictive Section 
13(b). This point was raised in Credit Bureau Center, and it 
 
 31. See Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 487–88 (1996).  
 32. Id. at 488.  
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (2018).  
 34. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (2018).  
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is one of the main reasons why the Seventh Circuit court 
ruled against the FTC in that case.35 The Seventh Circuit 
relied on language from a recent Supreme Court case, which 
stated that “[w]here Congress includes particular language 
in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of 
the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion.”36 We must assume that Congress acted 
intentionally when it used different wording in Section 13(b), 
and that therefore it did not intend for anything besides 
injunctions to be available under that section.  
There are serious problems with the FTC’s and courts’ 
reliance on Porter and Mitchell. The cases are outdated, the 
interpretation of the statute is flawed, and the legal 
reasoning is stretched to the breaking point. When the 
Supreme Court reviews this issue, it should rely on modern 
cases that deal with the issue more directly, instead of 
analogizing distantly related cases from decades ago. 
C. Extensive Caselaw Contradicts the FTC’s Position 
Besides the problems with the FTC’s reliance on Porter 
and Mitchell, other cases have held that the FTC’s 
interpretation of Section 13(b) is incorrect. In Federal Trade 
Commission v. Credit Bureau Center, L.C.C., the 7th Circuit 
held that “[r]estitution isn’t an injunction.”37 This bare 
statement of fact exposes the basic issue with the FTC’s 
entire argument. And contrary to what the FTC would have 
us believe, many courts agree with this simple and logical 
assertion. In Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass’n v. 
Landstar System, Inc., the court stated that “[i]njunctive 
relief constitutes a distinct type of equitable relief; it is not 
an umbrella term that encompasses restitution or 
 
 35. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Credit Bureau Ctr., L.L.C., 937 F.3d 764, 773 
(7th Cir. 2019).  
 36. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 430 (2009).  
 37. 937 F.3d 764, 771 (7th Cir. 2019). 
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disgorgement.”38 The court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes 
held that an equitable order for backpay is not an injunction, 
showing that all other forms of equitable relief are not 
covered by the term injunction.39 And in Owner-Operator 
Independent Drivers Ass’n v. New Prime, Inc., the court 
addressed this exact issue when it stated that disgorgement 
does not qualify as injunctive relief.40  
One other case that damages the FTC’s argument is the 
Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Liu v. Securities & 
Exchange Commission, where, in considering the statute 
that gives the SEC the ability to seek disgorgement, it noted 
that when courts interpret a statute, they must give effect to 
every clause and word of that statute.41 The corollary of that 
basic rule of statutory interpretation is that courts must not 
add words that are not there. When courts add their own 
unstated ideas into statutes, they go beyond what the 
judiciary is meant to do. These cases show that the FTC’s 
argument is built on a shaky foundation that relies on two 
old Supreme Court cases that might not even be decided the 
same way if they were ruled on today. The FTC’s authority 
to seek disgorgement is built on a house of cards that is ready 
to topple at the first sign of a breeze.  
The FTC should never have been granted power beyond 
what Congress specifically enacted in the statute. Federal 
agencies have no power to act in any way unless Congress 
expressly confers power onto them.42 In the case of the FTC, 
Congress gave it the power to seek preliminary and 
permanent injunctions in the proper cases.43 But agencies 
 
 38. 622 F.3d 1307, 1324 (11th Cir. 2010).  
 39. 564 U.S. 338, 365 (2011).  
 40. 213 F.R.D. 537, 545 (W.D. Mo. 2002), aff’d, 339 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir. 2003).  
 41. See 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1948 (2020). 
 42. See La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986); see also Lyng 
v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937 (1986) (“[A]n agency’s power is no greater than that 
delegated to it by Congress.”).  
 43. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2018).  
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cannot assume that they have plenary authority to act in an 
area just because Congress gave them some authority to act 
in that area.44 That is precisely what the FTC has done. It 
was given a specific amount of authority to seek injunctions 
when the law is being violated or is about to be violated,45 
and has aggressively expanded that authority to include a 
whole range of equitable powers that Congress never 
sanctioned. Now that the Supreme Court has taken up cases 
on this issue, it seems increasingly likely that it will rule 
against the FTC. 
Many courts have brought up other glaring issues with 
the FTC’s current enforcement scheme. Multiple cases have 
noted that the FTC is authorized to act when wrongdoers are 
violating or are about to violate the law, which would seem 
to exclude enforcement actions based purely on past conduct. 
But methods of restitution, such as disgorgement, are 
definitionally based on past conduct. In Federal Trade 
Commission v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc., the court held that it 
was “unambiguous” that “Section 13(b) does not permit the 
FTC to bring a claim based on long-past conduct without 
some evidence that the defendant ‘is’ committing or ‘is about 
to’ commit another violation.”46 The court used the “plain 
language” of Section 13(b) to show that the FTC does not 
have the power it claims it does.47 The Seventh Circuit raised 
this same argument in Credit Bureau Center, when it held 
that methods of restitution “do[n’t] sit comfortably with the 
text,” because injunctions are forward-facing, not backward-
looking.48 Black letter law also supports this argument.49 In 
 
 44. See Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 670 
(D.C. Cir.), amended, 38 F.3d 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1994).  
 45. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). 
 46. 917 F.3d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 47. Id. 
 48. 937 F.3d 764, 772 (7th Cir. 2019).  
 49. See 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 2942, at 47 (3d ed. 2013) (stating that injunctive relief looks to the future); 1 
DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.1(1), at 551 (2d ed. 1993) (defining restitution 
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short, the FTC has twisted the very meaning of the word 
injunction into something that has little basis in caselaw or 
black letter law.  
The FTC has demonstrated that it will use any means 
necessary to expand its power beyond what Congress 
intended. While it may believe that what it is doing is in the 
best interests of the country, there are many cases where it 
has reached far beyond its mission of protecting consumers, 
to the point where it has worked against the interests of the 
American public.  
D. Examples of FTC Overreach 
A recent case that is currently in litigation shows the 
extent of the FTC’s overreach. Zurixx, LLC, was a company 
that sold real estate and business education to consumers. 
The company had met with FTC officials twice a year 
through a Better Business Bureau trade organization called 
the Electronic Retailers Self-Regulation Program (“ERSP”) 
for well over five years. At these meetings, the company, as 
well as other companies, asked the FTC for review and 
guidance on compliance with federal trade regulations. 
Rather than providing clear guidance, issuing a cease and 
desist notice, or initiating an administrative hearing, as 
called for in Sections 5 and 19 of the FTC, the FTC 
purposefully side-stepped the due process requirements of 
those applicable Sections of the Act and, instead, blind-sided 
the company by bringing a sealed ex parte action under 
Section 13(b).50 The FTC asserted that the company’s actions 
posed an imminent harm to consumers, alleging that the 
company overstated the potential benefits of the education 
that the company offered and did not verbalize the company’s 
full written guarantee during sales presentations.51  
 
as a return of what the defendant gained in the transaction).  
 50. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Zurixx, L.L.C., No. 2:19-CV-00713, 2019 WL 
7790890, at *1 (D. Utah Oct. 1, 2019). 
 51. Id. at *2.  
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During the ex parte hearing, the FTC presented the 
federal court in the District of Utah with a very one-sided, 
skewed, and misleading set of “facts.” Taking the FTC at its 
word, the court entered an FTC-penned ruling that Zurixx, 
among other things, falsely represented the potential 
earnings of consumers and that Zurixx understated the 
amount of time and effort that consumers would need to 
spend to earn money from their real estate training.52 The 
array of heavy-handed enforcement methods that the FTC 
was granted shows the problem with its current enforcement 
scheme. Before the defendants were even given notice of the 
action, the FTC obtained multiple forms of “equitable relief” 
that do not necessarily fall under its statutory powers.53 The 
court allowed the FTC to seize the bank accounts of the 
company and its principals and use local law enforcement 
offers to raid the company’s offices, copy all of the company’s 
digital files and physical records, confiscate employee laptops 
and cell phones, and detain employees for hours and 
interview them with no attorneys present.54 The FTC then 
issued a press release defaming the company and, through a 
court-appointed monitor-turned-receiver, directed customers 
to institute refunds of over $20 million. A company, and its 
owners, that had diligently sought FTC guidance for over five 
years was stunned, bankrupted, needlessly defamed, and out 
of business before any semblance of due process was granted 
them. The FTC has now moved on to seek even more 
unlawful equitable relief, including rescission of contracts, 
restitution, disgorgement, and damages. These FTC actions 
take the statutory power permitting preliminary and 
permanent injunctions and expands them to a level that 
Congress never intended. 
Zurixx submitted a motion to dismiss that was partially 
based on the argument that Section 13(b) does not grant the 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. See generally infra Part II.  
 54. See Zurrix, L.L.C., 2019 WL 7790890, at *8–10. 
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FTC the right to seek restitution.55 In denying the motion, 
the court relied on the same set of cases that other courts 
have recently declined to extend or overturned in their 
respective jurisdictions. Zurixx argued that the plain 
language of the FTC Act does not allow for relief other than 
injunctive relief.56 It also pointed to the recent ruling in 
Credit Bureau Center, which stated that “section 13(b) does 
not authorize restitutionary relief.”57 The Tenth Circuit 
declined to adopt the reasoning in Credit Bureau Center, 
instead choosing to follow the Porter-Mitchell line of cases 
and Federal Trade Commission v. Freecom Communications, 
Inc.58 In Freecom, the Tenth Circuit held that Section 13(b) 
grants the FTC the ability to seek the “full range of equitable 
remedies.”59 By denying this motion, the Tenth Circuit 
upheld the flawed precedent that the FTC relies on to the 
detriment of business owners and employees. 
The FTC now has different enforcement methods 
available to it depending on what jurisdiction it is operating 
in. Because of the ruling in Credit Bureau Center, businesses 
in the Seventh Circuit are not subject to the range of 
equitable remedies that the FTC has access to in other areas 
of the country. This will cause a large amount of unfairness 
in enforcement until the Supreme Court comes to a decision 
on Credit Bureau Center. It means that some businesses will 
be subject to the array of questionably legal equitable 
remedies that the FTC is so quick to use in its enforcement 
actions, and others will only be subject to the plain language 
powers of Section 13(b). In order to have a fair, nationwide 
 
 55. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Zurixx, L.L.C., 441 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1220 (D. 
Utah 2020), motion to certify appeal denied, No. 2:19CV713-DAK-EJF, 2020 WL 
2043482 (D. Utah Apr. 28, 2020). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Credit Bureau Ctr., Inc., 937 F.3d 764, 
767 (7th Cir. 2019)).  
 58. See id. at 1221. 
 59. Id. (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 
1192, 1202 n.6 (10th Cir. 2005)).  
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enforcement scheme for the FTC, there needs to be 
consistency in its powers. Thankfully, the Supreme Court is 
now addressing this issue. But it is important that it acts 
quickly to overturn the Porter-Mitchell line of cases so that 
more businesses are not treated unfairly.  
There are many other examples of the FTC going too far 
in its enforcement actions and causing more harm than good. 
In one representative case, the FTC raided a Florida 
business called Vylah Tec, L.L.C. With the help of local 
police, the FTC entered the business and told employees to 
put their hands up and step away from their computers.60 
The FTC confiscated the employees’ cell phones.61 The FTC 
then detained the employees for hours and interviewed them 
with no attorney present.62 A federal court granted the FTC 
a preliminary injunction that appointed a receiver to control 
the business.63 Because of the raid, the business was unable 
to continue to operate. This caused a huge amount of 
hardship for the business’s customers, employees, and the 
owners of the business. This is the type of raid that 
exemplifies the problem with the FTC’s current enforcement 
scheme. If the FTC is not reined in by the Supreme Court, 
these raids will continue to happen, and mistakes are 
inevitable. If a raid like this happens to a business that is 
later cleared of wrongdoing, the damage will be severe and 
permanent, and innocent businesses should not be accepted 
as casualties of FTC enforcement. 
On several occasions, the extreme abuse of power that 
the FTC engages in has resulted in the suicide of stunned 
 
 60. Robert Cupo, The FTC Raided My Office, Found Nothing, and Is 
Destroying My Business Anyway, INVESTOR’S BUSINESS DAILY (Oct. 2, 2017, 3:10 
PM), https://www.investors.com/politics/commentary/the-ftc-raided-my-office-
found-nothing-and-is-destroying-my-business-anyway/. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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business owners and executives.64 When FTC enforcement 
actions result in the suicides of multiple business owners, 
those actions are long overdue for a close inspection. Our 
inspection of how the FTC interprets its ability to use Section 
13(b) that goes far beyond its statutory meaning shows that 
not only is the FTC improperly interpreting its statutory 
powers, but that it is also time for the Supreme Court to 
weigh in. 
The Supreme Court needs to address this problem by 
reining in the FTC’s enforcement powers back to what 
Congress originally intended. Until the Supreme Court does 
that, the FTC will continue to run wild and cause untold 




 64. The list of deceased includes, but is not limited to, Michael McLain Miller, 
Russ Whitney, Jr., Don Lapre, and Chad Huntsman. See MOBE’s Russell 
Whitney Dead, Susan Zanghi’s $318M Settlement, BEHIND MLM (Dec. 11, 2018), 
https://behindmlm.com/companies/mobe/mobes-russell-whitney-dead-susan-
zanghis-318m-settlement/; Obituary of Chad S. Huntsman, LEGACY.COM, 
https://www.legacy.com/obituaries/name/chad-huntsman-obituary?pid=1745 
98761 (last visited Nov. 11, 2020); Tom Harvey, Feds Sue Utah Companies, 
Including a Swallow Donor, for Alleged Fraud, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Feb. 21, 2014, 
5:01 PM), https://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=57577172&itype=cmsid; 
Philip Caulfield, Don Lapre, TV Pitchman Accused of Fraud, Found Dead in 
Arizona Jail Cell of Apparent Suicide, NY DAILY NEWS (Oct. 3, 2011, 8:19 PM), 
https://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/don-lapre-tv-pitchman-accused-
fraud-found-dead-arizona-jail-cell-apparent-suicide-article-1.959915; Obituary 
of Michael McLain Miller, LEGACY.COM, https://www.legacy.com/obituaries/the 
spectrum/obituary.aspx?n=mclain-miller&pid=179486062&fhid=18337 (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2020). 
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II. THE MISCHARACTERIZATION OF DISGORGEMENT AS 
EQUITABLE RELIEF 
A. History and Usage of Equitable Remedies 
The power that the FTC was granted by Congress in 
Section 13(b) is equitable in nature. The concept of equitable 
relief in American law sprang from the types of relief that 
were available under English Courts of Chancery.65 While 
equity as a whole is difficult to define, there are some basic 
principles that have guided the development of equitable 
relief. Traditionally, equity served the purpose of remedying 
defects in the common law, and it was applied in cases where 
using the common law would have undesirable effects that 
did not seem to fit the circumstances of the case.66 In general, 
equitable remedies were used to avoid injustice that would 
occur if the common law was used.67 They provided flexibility 
in situations where fair administration of justice called for 
it,68 and by doing so, equitable remedies have and will 
continue to serve an important purpose in the American 
common-law system. 
When founded, many states in the United States 
maintained separate courts of equity modeled after the 
English system.69 Courts of law and equity were separate 
until the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
1938.70 Now, in most states, there is no distinction between 
courts, and the same courts and judges apply both law and 
 
 65. See Howard L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20 
FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 24–25 (1951).  
 66. See id. at 24. 
 67. See id. at 25.  
 68. See Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 
530, 568–71 (2016).  
 69. See id. at 537.  
 70. See id. at 538; see also Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 
485 U.S. 271, 283 (1988) (“[T]he merger of law and equity . . . was accomplished 
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . .”).  
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equity.71 Although there has been significant overlap 
between the two types of law, the system of equitable 
remedies has stayed separate from legal remedies. One 
reason for this is the irreparable injury rule, which states 
that plaintiffs may not seek equitable remedies if a legal 
remedy would be adequate.72 Although precisely defining 
whether a legal remedy is adequate has been the subject of 
extensive debate, this rule is the basic dividing line between 
equitable and legal remedies.  
In modern American law, the use of equitable remedies 
is based on their traditional, historical use. Courts acting in 
equity have access to a few different types of equitable 
remedies. The classic equitable remedies that courts use are 
injunctions, accounting for profits, constructive trust, 
equitable liens, subrogation, equitable rescission, 
reformation, and specific performance.73 Injunctions allow 
courts to prohibit the defendant from taking certain actions, 
or require the defendant to take certain actions.74 Courts 
grant preliminary injunctions before a case is litigated in full 
in order to preserve the status quo,75 and permanent 
injunctions are given after the merits of the case have been 
decided.76 Courts apply four factors when deciding whether 
to grant a preliminary injunction: “(1) whether the movant 
will be irreparably harmed in the absence of an injunction, 
(2) the movant’s likelihood of success, (3) the balance 
between the harm to the movant and the harm to the 
 
 71. See Bray, supra note 68, at 538.  
 72. Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 687, 689 (1990).  
 73. See Bray, supra note 68, at 553–57.  
 74. Id. at 553; see also Nat’l Compressed Steel Corp. v. Unified Gov’t of 
Wyandotte Cty./Kansas City, 38 P.3d 723, 729 (Kan. 2002) (“An injunction is an 
equitable remedy . . . prohibiting or commanding certain acts.”). 
 75. See Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (describing the 
purpose of preliminary injunctions as to “preserve the relative positions of the 
parties until a trial on the merits can be held”).  
 76. Bray, supra note 68, at 553.  
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nonmovant, and (4) the public interest.”77  
For the purposes of this Article, injunctions will be the 
most important category of equitable relief to consider, 
because the under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, the FTC is 
entitled to seek preliminary and permanent injunctions.78 
Nothing in the history of equitable remedies or the history of 
injunctions supports the FTC’s position that it should have 
the power to seek disgorgement when the statute only grants 
it the power to seek injunctions.  
B. The FTC’s Misuse of Equitable Relief 
The FTC has characterized its practice of seeking 
disgorgement as an equitable remedy that falls under its 
statutory power to seek preliminary and permanent 
injunctions.79 The way that disgorgement is used by the FTC 
does not fit with the traditional view of equity. Both 
traditional views and usages of equity, as well as case law 
spanning hundreds of years, prove disgorgement, as used by 
the FTC, is not allowed by the statute that grants the agency 
power.  
Equitable remedies are limited to those categories of 
relief that have traditionally been available in equity. Those 
remedies are the ones that were available “during the days 
of the divided bench,” or the time before courts of law and 
courts of equity merged.80 In Great-West Life & Annuity 
Insurance Co. v. Knudson, the Supreme Court held the relief 
that the plaintiffs sought was legal, not equitable, because 
the funds at issue were not in the possession of the 
 
 77. Bethany M. Bates, Note, Reconciliation After Winter: The Standard for 
Preliminary Injunctions in Federal Courts, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1522, 1522–23 
(2011).  
 78. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)(2) (2018).  
 79. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Liu, 754 F. App’x 505, 509 (9th Cir. 
2018). 
 80. Montanile v. Bd. of Trs. of the Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan, 
136 S. Ct. 651, 657 (2016).  
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defendants.81 This would apply to many different FTC 
enforcement actions because the FTC often seeks to take 
back any and all money that was gained through the 
wrongdoing, even if it is no longer in the possession of the 
defendant. If the FTC does that, that makes it more of a legal 
remedy, not an equitable remedy, and it therefore does not 
have the power to seek it.  
The FTC’s use of disgorgement does not fit within the 
traditional view of equity because it is punitive. One of the 
main features of equity is that it should bring the situation 
back into balance, not punish one party or another. Courts 
have always tried to treat equity as “a court of conscience, . . . 
not a forum of vengeance.”82 Equity “permits only what is 
just and right with no element of vengeance or punishment 
. . . .”83 Courts of law are supposed to be where punishment 
is meted out by the court system; the function of courts of 
equity is not to administer punishment.84 Most recently, the 
Supreme Court affirmed that this remains the law, when in 
Liu, it held that a wrongdoer “should not be punished by 
‘pay[ing] more than a fair compensation to the person 
wronged.’”85 This is the traditional view of equity in 
American courts, and the FTC’s use of disgorgement does not 
fit within that view, because it goes beyond fair 
compensation and is really just a form of punishment. 
Disgorgement is a modern term that has no history in 
courts of equity.86 Unlike other monetary remedies with long 
histories in courts of equity, such as constructive trust or 
 
 81. See 534 U.S. 204, 214 (2002).  
 82. Bush v. Gaffney, 84 S.W.2d 759, 764 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).  
 83. Williamson v. Chi. Mill & Lumber Corp., 59 F.2d 918, 922 (8th Cir. 1932).  
 84. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 
703, 717–18 n.14 (1974). 
 85. 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1943 (2020) (citation omitted) (quoting Tilghman v. 
Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 145–46 (1888)). 
 86. See Thomas C. Mira, The Measure of Disgorgement in SEC Enforcement 
Actions Against Inside Traders Under Rule 10b-5, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 445 
(1985).  
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equitable liens, disgorgement is a modern invention never 
used by Courts of Chancery. As the Court stated in Kokesh, 
disgorgement is imposed for “punitive purposes.”87 Because 
the availability of equitable remedies is based on their 
historical and traditional use in our legal system, courts 
cannot create new remedies, especially when they go against 
the fundamental rule that equitable remedies should not be 
punitive.  
Case law also supports the argument that the FTC is 
misusing its ability to seek equitable remedies. In Liu, the 
Liu family challenged the SEC’s ability to seek 
disgorgement, and the Supreme Court dealt the SEC a major 
blow. Although this case dealt with the SEC and not the FTC, 
the SEC uses disgorgement in much the same way as the 
FTC does, and it is a dispositive case for the practice of 
disgorgement among government agencies. The backdrop of 
the case was the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kokesh v. 
Securities & Exchange Commission, which stated that 
disgorgement operates as a “penalty.”88 In Kokesh, the 
Supreme Court also included a footnote that intimated that 
courts had not properly applied disgorgement principles in 
the context of SEC enforcement actions.89 That led to Liu, 
which challenged the SEC’s enforcement methods and finally 
made its way to the Supreme Court three years later. In Liu, 
the Court held that disgorgement awards must not exceed a 
wrongdoer’s net profits, effectively making business 
expenses deductible from the amount of the disgorgement.90 
The SEC sought disgorgement that would equal the full 
amount of money that the defendants had raised in the 
course of their business.91 The Court found that to be beyond 
 
 87. 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1643 (2017). 
 88. Id. at 1642 (stating that a penalty is something that deters others from 
offending in a like manner and does not simply compensate victims for their loss).  
 89. See id. at n.3.  
 90. See 140 S. Ct. at 1940. 
 91. Id. at 1942. 
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what an equitable remedy should allow.92  
In its analysis, the Court asked whether the remedy of 
disgorgement fell into “those categories of relief that were 
typically available in equity.”93 This is the how the Court has 
traditionally determined whether a particular type of relief 
is equitable relief.94 The Court’s analysis showed that there 
are two principles that equitable remedies must follow. First, 
equity authorizes courts to take back ill-gotten gains, and 
second, equitable remedies must not merge with legal 
remedies by being punitive.95 The Court also noted that 
“disgorgement of improper profits” was how courts 
traditionally applied equitable remedies.96 However, that 
does not give the FTC unlimited power to seek restitution. 
The SEC is granted the right to seek equitable remedies in 
the statute granting it power,97 but the FTC is only granted 
the right to seek injunctions.98 This case will have a huge 
impact on the FTC’s ability to seek disgorgement, and the 
amount of disgorgement it will be able to seek. By affirming 
that equitable remedies must not be punitive, and that they 
must be limited to net profits only, defendants in FTC 
enforcement actions can argue the disgorgement the FTC 
seeks is illegal under Liu.  
Other cases also support the argument that the FTC has 
gone further than its statutory power allows. In Credit 
Bureau Center, the court stated that “[r]estitution isn’t an 
injunction” and that “statutory authorizations for 
injunctions don’t encompass other discrete forms of equitable 
 
 92. Id. at 1940.  
 93. Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 
U.S. 248, 256 (1993)).  
 94. See, e.g., CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 439 (2011).  
 95. Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1942. 
 96. Id. at 1943 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 
U.S. 412, 424 (1987)).  
 97. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (2018). 
 98. See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2018).  
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relief like restitution.”99 In that case, the FTC argued that 
the statute implicitly authorizes restitution. But the court 
disagreed with that argument because the statute grants the 
FTC the right to seek injunctions against defendants who are 
violating or about to violate the law.100 Seeking restitution 
against defendants does not fit within that power because 
the power is forward-looking, not backward-looking. 
Restitution is about taking back what was wrongfully 
gained, not preventing further violations of the law.  
Disgorgement, as currently used by the FTC, bears the 
same “hallmarks of a penalty” that the Court described in 
Kokesh.101 And when a remedy is a penalty, it cannot be an 
equitable remedy, because punishment is not the job of 
courts of equity.102 Although courts have acknowledged that 
equity is a flexible concept, that “flexibility is confined within 
the broad boundaries of traditional equitable relief.”103 
Accordingly, courts cannot make up new equitable remedies 
or start using legal remedies and call them equitable 
remedies.104 The system of equity in this country has always 
been based on the traditional remedies used by English 
Courts of Chancery, and expansion of those remedies merges 
the law of equitable remedies with legal remedies, which the 
Supreme Court has sought to avoid many times.105 To keep 
with the tradition of equitable remedies in this country, and 
be consistent with our reading of cases and statutes, the 
 
 99. 937 F.3d 764, 771–72 (7th Cir. 2019). 
 100. See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).  
 101. 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1644 (2017). 
 102. See Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 417 
U.S. 703, 717–18 n.14 (1974). 
 103. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 
322 (1999).  
 104. See id. at 321 (stating that courts cannot make up new forms of equitable 
relief to serve “the grand aims of equity”).  
 105. For example, in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson, 534 
U.S. 204, 209 (2002), the Court affirmed that equitable relief must mean 
something less than all relief. 
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FTC’s power to seek disgorgement must be curtailed.  
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS WITH FTC ENFORCEMENT 
METHODS 
A. The FTC Avoids Jury Trials by Using Section 13(b) 
There are also constitutional problems with the FTC’s 
enforcement scheme. The FTC strategically picks which 
enforcement methods to use in order to avoid giving 
defendants the option of having a jury trial. The Seventh 
Amendment guarantees defendants the right to a jury 
trial.106 Specifically, it states that “[i]n Suits at common law, 
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, 
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”107 The 
importance of this fundamental right in the American legal 
system cannot be overstated. The right to a jury trial has 
always given defendants the chance to argue their cases in 
front of normal citizens instead of a judge. This allows 
defendants to have their cases decided by normal people, who 
are not so constrained by stare decisis and judicial 
momentum that they cannot take a detached look at what is 
actually going on in the case. When the FTC strategically 
takes that opportunity away from a defendant, it takes away 
one of the basic rights of defendants in the American legal 
system.  
The FTC avoids jury trials by only seeking what it argues 
are equitable remedies. The Seventh Amendment only 
extends to cases where “legal rights” are at issue, not “those 
where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable 
remedies were administered . . . .”108 Therefore, when the 
court is acting in equity, defendants do not have a right to a 
jury trial. Courts have concluded that this rule applies to 
Section 13(b) enforcement actions. For example, in Federal 
 
 106. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.  
 107. Id. 
 108. Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove & Robeson, 28 U.S. 433, 447 (1830).  
2020] FTC OVERREACH AND ABUSE OF POWER 1507 
Trade Commission v. ELH Consulting, L.L.C., the court held 
that because the FTC sought “relief based on the court’s 
equitable powers,” the defendants had no right to a jury 
trial.109 The FTC takes full advantage of this aspect of 
Section 13(b) to skirt the requirements of the Seventh 
Amendment, making sure that defendants have only the 
most limited options in their cases. 
The problem with this strategy is that the actual 
enforcement methods in Section 13(b) have more in common 
with legal remedies than equitable remedies.110 This gives 
the FTC an advantage because it gets to use powerful 
remedies that seem like legal remedies without having to 
fight and win a verdict from a jury trial. On the other hand, 
if the FTC were to use Section 19 of the FTC Act, defendants 
would have the right to a jury trial because Section 19 
contains legal remedies. And if the case involved both legal 
and equitable claims, then the legal claims could be tried to 
a jury first, followed by the rest of the case being tried by a 
judge.111 The FTC has purposefully arranged a system where 
defendants are as disadvantaged as possible. If courts 
continue to allow the FTC to use these so-called equitable 
remedies in its enforcement actions, then defendants will not 
have access to the rights guaranteed to them in the 
Constitution.  
B. Restitution Under Section 13(b) Violates the Eighth 
Amendment 
The FTC frequently uses Section 13(b) to impose massive 
fines on businesses,112 a practice which is in violation of the 
 
 109. No. CV 12-02246-PHX-FJM, 2013 WL 593885, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 7, 
2013); see also Danjaq L.L.C. v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 962 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(observing that there is no right to a jury for equitable claims).  
 110. See supra Part II.  
 111. See Colo. Visionary Acad. v. Medtronic, Inc., 397 F.3d 867, 875 (10th Cir. 
2005). 
 112. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Publishers Bus. Servs., Inc., No. 2:08–cv–
00620–APG–GWF, 2017 WL 451953, at *7 (D. Nev. Feb. 1, 2017) (upholding a 
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Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines. The 
Eighth Amendment provides protection against excessive 
fines imposed by the government.113 The main goal of the 
Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause is to ensure that 
the amount of forfeiture is proportional to the gravity of the 
offense.114 If the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the 
offense, then it is in violation of the Eighth Amendment.115 
There are many examples of the FTC violating this principle 
by imposing huge fines on businesses that are far out of 
proportion with the offense.  
In U.S. Department of Justice v. Daniel Chapter One, the 
court refused to consider the defendants’ argument that the 
restitution the FTC sought violated the Eighth Amendment, 
because the defendants failed to show the penalty was 
punitive and disproportionate.116 The court stated that, 
because the defendants raised the issue in a cursory fashion, 
the court would decline to resolve it.117 From this case, we 
can conclude that courts require defendants to show two 
factors when making an argument under the Excessive Fines 
Clause: the payment is punitive and it is disproportionate 
with the offense. Many of the judgments that defendants in 
Section 13(b) cases have to pay satisfy both of these 
requirements.  
The disgorgement that the FTC frequently seeks 
constitutes a fine under the Eighth Amendment. A statutory 
forfeiture is a fine under the Eighth Amendment if it is a 
punishment.118 Forfeitures that are “nonpunitive” do not fall 
 
$24 million disgorgement payment). 
 113. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
 114. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998).  
 115. See id. 
 116. 89 F. Supp. 3d 132, 154–55 (D.D.C. 2015), aff’d, 650 F. App’x 20 (D.C. Cir. 
2016).  
 117. Id. at 155.  
 118. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 331 n.6. 
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under the Eighth Amendment.119 In Kokesh, the Court 
established that disgorgement, as used by the SEC, bore “all 
the hallmarks of a penalty.”120 This was because 
disgorgement is imposed with the intent to deter future 
conduct, not to compensate for the wrongdoing that was 
already committed.121 The FTC uses disgorgement in much 
the same way as the SEC. The FTC imposes massive fines on 
businesses that do more than remedy past wrongs. The fines 
are warnings to other businesses to not repeat the behavior, 
and the FTC seeks to make the fines as high as possible to 
further that goal. Under the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Kokesh, that makes the fines a punishment, not a remedial 
measure.  
Some of the fines that the FTC imposes are vastly 
disproportional to the offense that it seeks to punish. After 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Liu, it is established law that 
disgorgement payments that exceed net profits are not 
allowed.122 Even though that case dealt with the SEC and 
not the FTC, the same principle should apply because 
disgorgement as used by the FTC is functionally the same as 
when it is used by the SEC. However, the FTC has 
continually sought disgorgement payments that far exceed 
the net profits acquired in the course of the wrongdoing. That 
makes the disgorgement disproportionate because it goes 
beyond taking back the money that was gained by the 
wrongful scheme.  
The FTC’s use of disgorgement in Section 13(b) 
enforcement actions violates the Eighth Amendment. The 
imposed fines are grossly disproportionate to the crimes they 
seek to remedy, and there is an intention to punish the 
businesses instead of simply returning the parties to the 
status quo. The FTC cannot be allowed to continue levying 
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these unconstitutional fines on businesses. The effect is 
businesses being destroyed without the protections that they 
have the right to under the Constitution. Of course, 
consumers should be protected, but violating the Eighth 
Amendment is not the best way to achieve that goal.  
C. The FTC’s Use of Receivers is Contrary to the Intention of 
the Fourth Amendment 
The FTC uses receivers to avoid the requirement of 
obtaining a search warrant before gaining access to 
materials and information belonging to defendants. The 
Fourth Amendment provides protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.123 However, when the 
FTC appoints a receiver in a case, that receiver can demand 
businesses to turn over information without the normal 
procedural protections that go along with obtaining a proper 
search warrant. In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court 
established that people and businesses under investigation 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy.124 The general rule 
is that when a person has a subjective expectation of privacy, 
and society would recognize that expectation as reasonable 
(the objective requirement), then a search warrant is 
required to search that location.125 The FTC gets around that 
rule by appointing receivers, who can then demand materials 
from businesses without having to go through the formal 
process of obtaining a search warrant. 
In Federal Trade Commission v. Pointbreak Media, 
L.L.C., the FTC acquired laptops and other electronically 
stored information by way of a receiver, thereby avoiding any 
Fourth Amendment protections that would come with 
getting a search warrant.126 The court denied the defendants’ 
arguments that a search warrant was necessary because the 
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evidence submitted by the FTC constituted probable cause 
for the seizure of the materials.127 But that goes against the 
intention and meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and the 
FTC takes full advantage of that. The FTC is able to simply 
present its evidence, and when a receiver is appointed, it 
essentially acts as a general search warrant for every asset 
of the business.  
General search warrants violate the particularity 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. In Groh v. Ramirez, 
the Supreme Court held that any search warrant must state 
the particular items that are going to be seized.128 And in 
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, the Court affirmed that a 
warrant that does not follow the particularity requirement is 
unconstitutional.129 But when the FTC is able to appoint a 
receiver, it has access to all the assets of the business and 
can search them at will. Indeed, the “central purpose” of 
appointing a receiver is the seizure of all assets.130 There is 
never any statement of which particular items are going to 
be searched. Appointing a receiver has the opposite effect. It 
allows the FTC to access any and all assets of the business 
without having to explain why those particular items are 
subject to search and seizure. This does not square with the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  
The FTC’s use of receivers to seize assets acts as a 
general warrant and is clearly in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. This type of behavior is contrary to the basic 
intention of the Fourth Amendment, which is to protect 
defendants from wide-ranging searches that are 
unsupported by evidence against them. Appointing receivers 
allows the FTC to go fishing for any possible evidence against 
the defendants, and the defendants do not have the 
opportunity to defend themselves from it. The FTC’s use of 
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this strategy further shows that there is a pattern of avoiding 
procedural protections and using loopholes in order to 
destroy businesses’ opportunities to defend themselves. 
CONCLUSION 
The FTC’s power has grown to an unacceptable and 
lethal level. When the Supreme Court addresses this issue, 
it will have the chance to bring the FTC’s enforcement 
powers back to what Congress intended. And it looks likely 
that it will. After the decisions in Kokesh and Liu, the 
Supreme Court has shown that it agrees with reducing the 
power that federal agencies have when it comes to using 
disgorgement as an enforcement method. With those 
recently decided cases setting the tone of the Supreme Court, 
it seems likely that the Court will follow the lead of the 
Seventh Circuit in Credit Bureau Center and bring the FTC’s 
power back into line with the original meaning of the statute.  
The FTC should never have been allowed to have 
disgorgement in its arsenal of enforcement methods. It 
initially gained the ability to seek disgorgement by relying 
on old and inapposite caselaw. It then worked to build a 
foundation of precedential cases that courts had little choice 
but to follow. The FTC reconstructed the entire meaning of 
the statutory language and redefined what equitable relief 
means to suit its own purposes. Its use of disgorgement has 
strayed so far from traditional equitable remedies that it is 
not recognizable as equitable any longer. And during this 
process, the FTC has infringed on, or found loopholes around, 
multiple constitutional rights. This slippery slope of stronger 
and stronger enforcement methods has had a terrible effect 
on businesses and people around the country.  
The damage that has been caused to businesses and 
private citizens of this country by the FTC’s overreach is 
hard to quantify. But it has been far too high of a cost for the 
benefit that the country has received in return. The FTC lost 
sight of its purpose in its quest to expand its power to its 
current level, and the only thing that can stop this out-of-
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control process is for the Supreme Court to make the right 
decision and limit the FTC’s enforcement power. 
